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William C. Wimsatt, Re-Engineering 
Philosophy for Limited Beings 




A good word to describe Wimsatt's 
book would certainly be messiness. But this 
is not meant as a negative critique. Wimsatt's 
central interest is the messiness of our world 
and of our ways to understand it. This is 
reflected in the complexity of the analysis 
offered here. The thirteen chapters form a 
rich web of interconnected concepts, which 
are expounded in different contexts to help an 
understanding of their different meanings. 
This book, which is a collection of articles 
written during Wimsatt's long career, offers a 
very original philosophical perspective on the 
sciences. 
By focusing on messiness and 
complexity, Wimsatt departs strongly from 
what most philosophers of science have been 
doing until relatively recently. Indeed, he 
rejects the mainstream philosophy of science 
for different reasons. First, from an 
epistemological point of view, he criticizes 
the idealizations philosophers have 
constantly made in their descriptive and 
normative discourses about science. Second, 
from an ontological point of view, he wants 
to replace Quine's desert ontology with what 
he calls "a tropical forest" ontology. 
The book is structured in four parts. 
The first two are essentially devoted to 
methodological issues. The third part deals 
with the ontology of complex systems and its 
consequences for scientific approaches — 
mainly reductionist strategies. The last part is 
partly autobiographical and throws 
interesting light on Wimsatt's intellectual 
journey, which has lead him to recognize 
how essential the practical dimensions of 
science are. 
There are many ways to travel 
through this original philosophical landscape. 
One important starting point is the full 
recognition that human beings are limited in 
their cognition, inferences, computation, 
representation, and so on. Taken seriously, 
this must lead to a rejection of what he calls 
"the myths of LaPlacean omniscience" that 
form the tacit assumptions inherited from 
logical empiricism. According to Wimsatt, 
many problems have arisen because of these 
highly idealized accounts of science and the 
cure should come from a careful analysis of 
scientists' real practice. Wimsatt thus tries to 
build a more naturalistic philosophy of 
science. Naturalism has been proclaimed by 
many philosophers in the recent past, but 
according to Wimsatt their naturalism was 
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not naturalistic enough. 
Wimsatt’s exploration of real 
science has convinced him of the importance 
of errors and heuristics. In this new picture 
practical problems of scientific methodology 
and heuristics become much more important 
than in principle claims (i.e. what could be 
done in an idealized science, without 
computational limits or with perfectly 
rational agents). Our scientific strategies are 
full of errors and biases, but contrary to some 
philosophers, Wimsatt does not think that this 
should lead us to endorse a kind of relativism. 
He is fascinated by how scientists are so 
often successful despite having to work with 
unreliable methods. The answer to this 
puzzle is to be found in the study of heuristic 
techniques. Studying heuristics instead of 
axioms and rigid logical structures gives a 
much more dynamic view of science. For 
example, in chapter six, by carefully 
analyzing a famous episode in the 
constitution of classical genetics, Wimsatt 
shows how the use of deliberately false 
models can be a very powerful tool in the 
search for better theories. 
The key concept for reconciling 
faillibilist methods and realism is robustness. 
This is where methodology and ontology 
meet. Defined as "the use of multiple 
independent means to detect, derive, measure, 
manipulate, or otherwise to access entities, 
phenomena, theorems, properties, and other 
things we wish to study" (p.37), robustness 
constitutes the most important criterion for 
reality and for identifying artifacts. This idea 
is quite simple: each way to access an entity 
is certainly not completely reliable, but when 
independent methods (and they should be 
truly independent, which is something 
difficult to determine in real cases) detect the 
same entity, it is then highly improbable that 
it is only the result of a bias in our methods. 
This criterion for reality has many 
important consequences for ontology. First, 
this leads to a local realism instead of a 
global one, because each method works only 
locally. The second consequence is a rich 
ontology, because the criterion of robustness 
forces us to recognize entities at many 
different levels. Wimsatt offers an in-depth 
discussion about the ontological structure of 
the world. He devotes many pages to the 
notion of levels of nature (especially in chap. 
10), which is the fundamental structure in his 
account. But levels do not exhaust the 
structure of the world. He defines two other 
kinds of entities: perspectives and causal 
thickets. It is of course not possible to 
describe here in detail how these entities are 
conceived by Wimsatt, but the important 
point is that this ontology has further 
consequences. In this complex world, we 
have several ways of decomposing systems, 
 - 173 -
and each has a kind of autonomy. Many 
problems are not only multi-level but also 
multiperspectival, which means that no 
perspective is sufficient in itself. However, 
when we put these perspectives together we 
have to face what Wimsatt calls "the problem 
of conceptual coordination": how to 
articulate and integrate our partial theories. 
This is not an easy task and this often leads to 
misleading decomposition and articulation of 
systems. Realism plays a central role here, 
because one essential requirement to achieve 
the integration of these different views is to 
assume that they have a common referent. It 
is remarkable how Wimsatt insists on the 
fundamentally fragmentary nature of our 
worldview but without accepting any 
relativist conclusion. 
The concept of levels is closely 
linked to those of emergence and reduction, 
which are discussed in several chapters of the 
book (mainly in chap. 11 and 12). But in 
Wimsatt's framework the problem of 
reductionism looks very different from how it 
has been discussed traditionally. Reduction is 
not defined in terms of formulating logical or 
deductive connections between levels 
understood as linguistic entities. Wimsatt is 
interested in how scientists study and 
decompose complex systems, and thus in 
reductionist strategies. He is one of the first 
philosophers of science who advocated a 
mechanistic framework to think about 
relations between levels. His definition of a 
reductive explanation is a causal one: "a 
reductive explanation of a behavior or a 
property of a system is one that shows it to be 
mechanistically explicable in terms of the 
properties of and interactions among the parts 
of the system." (p.275) 
The concept of reductive 
explanation defended in this book not only 
strongly rejects any form of eliminativism, 
but also shows the limits of purely 
functionalist approaches, because it is 
necessary to take into account lower-level 
mechanisms in order to better characterize 
and explain higher-level phenomena. It gives 
a complex picture in which each level 
constrains other levels and theories at 
different levels follow a kind of 
co-evolutionary process. This analysis of the 
inter-level mechanistic model construction 
has opened the way for a rich tradition in the 
last twenty years (see for example the work 
of William Bechtel, Robert Richardson, 
Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver). Wimsatt's 
position on this issue is interesting because he 
defends a kind of reductionism that 
recognizes the uneliminability of upper-level 
entities and avoids the fallacy of "nothing 
but-ism". 
What is perhaps the most important 
contribution of Wimsatt's work for the 
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philosophy of science is his idea that we 
should completely change the models we use 
to think about the sciences. It is well known 
that logical empiricists almost entirely 
focused on physics, which was seen as the 
paradigm for all the sciences. Wimsatt early 
on started to think seriously about biology, 
not only for the specific philosophical 
problems it raises (this corresponds to the 
regionalization of the philosophy of science, 
which started in the 1970's), but most 
importantly as a model for a general 
philosophy of science. Together with 
engineering (Wimsatt's original specialty), 
biology (especially evolutionary biology) 
provides a fertile source for understanding 
the world and the methods we use to 
understand it. First, it gives a more realistic 
idea of how most sciences are practiced: 
"Engineering shows—writ large—the robust 
pragmatic realism and other heuristic 
elements permeating methodology as 
practiced in all sciences but often obscured 
in their more formal statements." (p.315) In a 
complete reversal, instead of considering 
fundamental sciences, like physics, as the 
paradigm for understanding all the sciences, 
Wimsatt sees them as special cases. Second, 
reasons and rationality, our bodies and minds, 
are engineered objects, in the sense that they 
are the results of evolutionary processes. 
Looking at them from that point of view will 
bring completely new insight to philosophers 
as well as to scientists. Here Wimsatt has 
followed the paths opened in the 1950's by 
people like Herbert Simon and Donald 
Campbell. 
In summation, this is an extremely 
dense book, full of many original and 
provocative ideas. This is of course not to say 
that all of these ideas are unproblematic, but 
these difficulties cannot be discussed here. 
Some chapters are certainly quite difficult to 
read and the reader will sometimes wonder if 
Wimsatt could not have formulated some 
arguments with more clarity. But this 
certainly reflects an essential aspect of 
Wimsatt's thinking—his fertile mind 
exploring with great excitement many 
directions at the same time. Several important 
philosophers have been inspired by Wimsatt's 
work and are now exploring similar issues, 
but there is still more to find in it and there is 
little doubt that this book will continue to 
stimulate many other thinkers. 
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